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MARBURY v. MADISON AROUND THE WORLD
MARK TUSHNET·

I. INTRODUCTION

The bicentennial of Marbury v. Madison, I coupled with a growing
awareness among U.S. constitutionalists that other nations also have
constitutions, has produced, probably predictably, a new conventional wisdom.
The assertion as a fact that constitution-makers around the world have decided
to emulate the U.S. institution of judicial review of legislation for its
compatibility with fundamental law has escaped the banal Law Day
speech into the law reviews. 2 Of course, it is accurate to note that lawmaking
system designers have created courts with the power to determine
constitutionality-systems that Bruce Ackerman cal1s "constrained
parliamentarianism."3 However, I believe it is misleading to think that these
systems emulate the U.S. institution of judicial review.
To put the point somewhat strongly for emphasis, the U.S. system of
judicial review is now something of an outlier among systems of constitutional
review. In this Essay, I consider three aspects of such systems: the structures
of review, the theories of review, and the forms of review. My aim is
primarily one of description, aiming to highlight the ways in which the U.S.
system resembles and differs from the newer systems of judicial review. The
U.S. system of judicial review has close-and more distant-relatives in each
of these categories. However, the U.S. system remains distinctive in that it
combines particular elements into an overal1 system that is nearly unique in the
world.
Comparative study might lead us to consider whether changing some
aspects of our system ofjudicial review would improve the overall functioning
of our version of constitutional democracy. Most, though not all, aspects of
the U.S. system are embedded in the written Constitution and thus, for all
practical purposes, are immune from amendment. Other aspects are
entrenched, less formally, in the U.S. equivalent of unwritten constitutional

• Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law
Center. I would like to thank James Stoner for his comments on a much shorter version of this
Essay.
\. Marbury v. Madison,S U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. For an overview, see Louis Favoreu, Constitutional Review in Europe, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF mE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

ABROAD 38 (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990).

3. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 1\3 HARv. L. REv. 633, 664·66,
668·69 (2000) (offering constrained parliamentarian ism as an alternative to American and
British lawmaking processes and recognizing the necessity of judicial review to safeguard the
"operational realit[y)" of constitutional principles from capricious parliamentary legislation).
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conventions of a sort that characterizes the British constitutional system.
Reflection on experience with other systems of judicial review might lead us
to consider altering those conventions. Yet, systems ofjudicial review are just
that-systems-and changes in one or a few parts might have unexpected
effects on others. In the end, comparison between the U.S. and other systems
of judicial review is partly an exercise in civic education and partly an effort
to restore "reflection and choice" in our system design.4

II. STRUCTURES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Scholars of comparative constitutional law have devoted a great deal of
attention to the structures of judicial review. s This scholarship has made the
important variables familiar, and I will confine my comments to only a few.
First, constitutional review can be lodged either in a generalist court, which
has jurisdiction over ordinary law (e.g., through statutory interpretation) as
well as constitutional law, or in a specialist court. 6 The U.S. Supreme Court
is a generalist court in this sense, one of only a handful around the world.'

4. The phrase "reflection and choice" is from THE FEDERALIST No. I, at 89 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).
S. By "structures of judicial review," I mean the formal design of the institutions of
judicial review. I put aside, for present purposes, other institutional designs for constitutional
review such as Ombuds-offices, parliamentary committees on the constitution, and the like.
6. The choice is related to the theory of judicial review held by institution designers.
For a discussion, see Part III of this Essay.
7. One relevant factor in deciding whether to create generalist courts, perhaps relevant
to the creation of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1789 and to other such courts more recently, is the
number of judges eligible for high courts taken as a whole. A nation with relatively few
competent judges might choose to use them intensively in a generalist court, rather than either
concentrating the competent ones in a specialized constitutional court (or in the ordinary courts)
or dispersing the competent judges among all the courts, with the risk that overall quality would
be lower than could be achieved by concentrating the competent judges in one court or set of
courts. Examples of the impact of the size of the available pool of judges are interesting. In
Latvia, questions arose about the propriety of several Constitutional Court judges sitting to
review a statute because some had "taken part in passing the disputed statute, and one of them
was married to the [head of the legislature)." CAROLINE TAUBE, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
ESTONIA, LATVIA AND LITHUANIA: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 141
(200 I). In response, the Latvian legislature amended the statute establishing the Constitutional
Court and barred any challenges to the impartiality of such judges. The Court subsequently
upheld the statute. [d. A cognate problem arose in Marbury itself: John Marshall was the
Secretary of State who had failed to deliver Marbury's commission, and his brother James
attested to the fact that the President had indeed signed the commission. See Marbury v.
Madison, S U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 146 (1803). For another example of the effects of the small
size of a legal elite on constitutional structure, see Mark Tushnet, Dual Office Holding and the
Constitution: A View from Haybum's Case, in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS
ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 196 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992).
However, this consideration does not explain why Canada created a system of constitutional
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Most of the world's constitutional courts are specialized courts, dealing solely
with constitutional law; Germany's Constitutional Court is perhaps the most
emulated of these specialized constitutional courts.
Second, the power to review legislation for its constitutionality can be
concentrated in a single constitutional court, as in Gennany, or dispersed so
that every court has the power to rule on constitutionality, as in the United
States. s Designers ofa concentrated system usually must devise some system
of referrals so that trial courts-or appellate courts with specialized statutory
jurisdiction, as over administrative law---can refer cases that raise
constitutional questions to the only court with power to rule on those
questions. 9 Doing so is not all that difficult, although designers sometimes can
make mistakes that lead to gaps in the possibility of judicial review for
constitutionality.10 In large nations, dispersed systems of judicial review pose
a different problem-one that is more difficult to design around. The sheer
number of decision-makers authorized to interpret the constitution makes it

review in 1982 with a generalist constitutional court, nor why Great Britain's initial move in
the direction of constitutional review, the system established by the Human Rights Act 1998,
uses a generalist court. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms), § 24( I) (authorizing judicial remedy "as the court considers appropriate
and just in the circumstances" for the infringement of one's constitutional rights or freedoms);
id. pt. VII (General), § 52( I) (stating that any laws inconsistent with the Canadian Constitution
are, "to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect"); Human Rights Act, 1998, c.42
(Eng.). It is at least possible that there is something about the common-law tradition that
conduces to the choice of a generalist court for judicial review. Interestingly, the Blair
government recently proposed to create a new Supreme Court, although the proposal lacked
sufficient detail to determine whether the government envisioned a specialized court, as seems
likely, or a generalist one. See DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSTITUTIONAL
REFORM: A SUPREME COURT FOR tHE UNITED KINGOOM 19-22 (2003) (consultation
paper) (noting that establishing a new court would "restore a single apex to the UK's
judicial system where all . . . constitutional issues can be considered"), available at
http://www.dca.gov.uklconsultlsupremecourtlsupreme.pdf.
8. My personal favorite to illustrate this point is Thompson v. City o/Louisville, 362 U.S.
199 (1960), in which the U.S. Supreme Court overturned a conviction on review of a decision
by the police court of the city of Louisville, Kentucky, the highest state court in which review
could be had of Thompson's constitutional claim. [d. at 202-03,206.
9. Conceptually, system designers could create something like the U.S. "final judgment
rule," allowing litigants to raise constitutional claims only after the highest court with
jurisdiction over their nonconstitutional claims has finally resolved them. Often, however, the
constitutional claim will be dispositive, and a final judgment rule would impose unnecessary
costs of delay and uncertainty. Similar considerations have led to some relaxation of the final
judgment rule in the United States. E.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 485-86
( 1975).
10. Designing a concentrated system of constitutional review for a small nation is, I
suspect, easier than designing one for a large nation. Still, some rather large nations, like
Germany, have concentrated systems of review. Accordingly, I think that a nation's size affects
design issues but not the basic choice between concentrated and dispersed systems.
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possible for a rogue judge to get away with an interpretation that would be
rejected by the nation's highest constitutional court, but which that court lacks
the time or other resources to review. 1\
Third, judicial review comes in what are conventionally called abstract
and concrete forms. In abstract review, the constitutional court is authorized
to consider the constitutionality of legislative proposals or statutes before they
go into effect. For example, the Canadian Supreme Court, similar in some
ways to the U.S. Supreme Court, has "reference" jurisdiction under which the
government can seek that Court's views on the constitutionality of legislation
the government has under consideration. 12 The basic constitutional designs in
Gennany and France placed abstract review at the core. In the early years of
both systems, a limited number of government officials could present
constitutional objections to the constitutional court before legislation took
effect. 13 The number of officials authorized to do so has gradually expanded
to the point that a minority outvoted in the legislature has an almost automatic
right to invoke the constitutional court's jurisdiction. 14
Scholars typically use the U.S. "case or controversy" requirementl s to
illustrate concrete review. 16 The constitutional convention rejected Madison's
proposal to create a "Council of Revision" that would have exercised a form
of abstract review. In its stead, they placed the case or controversy
requirement. 17 Fonnally, the U.S. Supreme Court cannot determine the
constitutionality oflegislation in the absence ofan individual plaintiff who has

11. This problem is offset to some degree both by the fact that the rogue judge's
interpretation prevails only within his jurisdiction and that higher courts are likely, though not
guaranteed, to rein in the judge on issues of broader significance;
12. See Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., ch. 5-26, § 53 (1985) (Can.). See generally James
L. Huffman & MardiLyn Saathoff, Advisory Opinions and Canadian Constitutional
Development: The Supreme Court's Reference Jurisdiction, 74 MINN. L. REv. 1251 (1990)
(discussing the historical basis for reference jurisdiction in Canada and evaluating both
theoretical and practical concerns regarding its exercise). The reference jurisdiction can be used
to finesse delicate political questions: By obtaining a determination that a proposal for which
there is substantial political support would be unconstitutional if enacted, the government can
place the blame for its refusal to enact the legislation on the constitutional court (rather than on
the government's own disagreement with the proposal as a matter oflegislative policy).
13. See Favoreu, supra note 2, at 41,52-53.
14. See John C. Reitz, Political &onomy as a Major Architectural Principle of Public
Law, 75 TlIL. L. REv. 1121, 1131 (2001). However, that right is not always exercised.
15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
16. See, e.g., Gustavo Fernandes de Andrade, Comparative Constitutional Law: Judicial
Review,3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 977, 979 (2001); Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive
Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARv. L. REv. 1833, 1852 n.100 (2001);
Michel Rosenfeld, Justices at Work: An Introduction, 18 CARDOzOL. REv. 1609, 1611 (1997).
17. The Council of Revision idea was rejected, not primarily because it involved abstract
review, but because it involved policy-based review of all state legislation.
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suffered, or is imminently likely to suffer, harm resulting from the statute she
seeks to challenge. 18
It is worth noting here that the distinction between abstract and concrete
review has blurred as nations gain experience with their systems of judicial
review. In systems nominally committed to abstract review in centralized
courts, referrals and review of final decisions by the ordinary courts can lead
to some degree of concrete review. Furthermore, in the United States,
standing and similar justiciability requirements have been loosened to the
point that it is now almost routine for people to challenge legislation
immediately upon its enactment-and have their claims adjudicated on the
My favorite example is the successful challenge to the
merits. 19
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), which was filed on the day the
statute was to take effect and which resulted in an immediate preliminary
injunction against the government. 20 Consequently, the government could not
enforce the CDA until the Supreme Court ruled on the merits of the
constitutional challenge. 21 The litigation structure of the challenge to the
Bipartisan Campaign Finance Act of2002 is the same: enactment, immediate
constitutional challenge because the mere enactment has effects on campaign
finance activities, and a ruling on the merits. 22 The case or controversy
requirements of standing and ripeness remain formally in place, but, in fact
today, a well-counseled potential litigant can design a lawsuit that is, in all but
the most formal of senses, a version of abstract review.
Fourth and finally, systems vary in how they assure the independence of
judges on constitutional courts. Although independence is, of course, a
fundamental requirement, how it is achieved is not uniform. The U.S. choice
of life tenure with no age qualification, either at entry or on exit (that is,
minimum experience requirements or mandatory retirement ages), is quite
unusual. The typical choice is to give constitutional court judges relatively
long tenures, on the order of twelve to fifteen years, without the possibility of
reappointment, coupled with age requirements for appointment and mandatory
retirement. The U.S. system gives appointing authorities incentives, which
designers of other systems of judicial review have thought inappropriate, to
seek out young appointees who will be in a position to perpetuate the
appointing authorities' vision of how the constitution should be interpreted
years after the appointing authorities have left office.

18. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
19. Although, in the ordinary case, legislators or other officials cannot initiate these
challenges, there is a real possibility of coordination between representatives in the legislature
who lose out and interest groups who supply plaintiffs for litigation.
20. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 861 (1997).
21. See id. at 864.
22. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 124 S. Ct. 619, 654 (2003) (describing the
case's procedural history).
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I conclude this sketch of the structures of judicial review with two
observations about collateral matters. The first involves the difference
between common-law and civil-law systems. To oversimplify, a judge in a
civil-law system is a judicial bureaucrat for whom being a judge is a career
choice made quite early in that person's legal career. Civil-law judges work
in a bureaucratic hierarchy under the administrative supervision of higher
judges whose judgments about the subordinates' performance affect the
possibility of career advancement. This arrangement may be entirely adequate
for the administration of ordinary, non constitutional law if one thinks-as
most civil lawyers do-that the range of discretion in interpreting and
applying ordinary law is relatively small. But, if there are differences in this
respect between ordinary and constitutional law-a point I take up next-it
might be unwise to give judges with that sort of career line a dominant, or
perhaps even a large, role on a constitutional court. Rather, system designers
might want to ensure, to the extent they can, that appointing authorities place
a mix of experienced politicians, academics, and ordinary-law judges on the
constitutional court. 23
The second collateral observation is that many of the world's new
constitutional courts have been created in nations emerging from a period of
authoritarian government. Deciding who should be the judges on the
constitutional court in such nations is quite difficult. Many of the judges
already sitting will be tainted by their association with the prior regime. They
will have rendered decisions that seem quite inappropriate after the transition.
System designers might want to ensure that such judges not sit on the
constitutional court--even if they survive standard lustration procedures aimed
at ridding the new government of people who were deeply implicated in the
prior system's operations. Looking outside the existing judiciary, to the
academy and to politicians, might seem attractive.
However, countervailing considerations must be weighed against the
desire to look outside the existing judiciary. After all, sitting judges will have
experience in judging. Finding replacements for them creates a real risk that
the public, already skeptical about the integrity of government because of its
experience under the authoritarian regime, will see the new judges simply as
stooges for the new government, lacking independence because of their ties to
the new order that gave them their new jobs, rather than as spokespeople of
''the law." Furthermore, sitting judges might defuse the charge of
collaboration ism by pointing to the degree to which strict legal positivism,

23. Such judicial diversity could be advanced either by specifying qualifications in the
constitution itself or by setting up the appointment system in a way that gives appointing
authorities appropriate incentives. A fairly extended period of time should be used as a frame
of reference when assessing the effectiveness of an incentive-based appointive system.
Accordingly, the recent U.S. practice of requiring that Supreme Court nominees have some
nontrivial judicial experience, when viewed in an appropriately long time frame, might not
count against the U.S. system.
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assuming its presence, pervaded the legal culture. 24 These judges could say,
in effect, that their positivist commitments led them to enforce the laws of the
old regime without regard to their personal views of the morality of those
laws, and that, after the transition, they will just as faithfully enforce the laws
in place under the new regime. 2s

III. lHEORIES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
By "theories" of judicial review, I refer both to accounts that describe
constitutional law as ordinary law, whose only distinctive characteristic is that
it is supreme over other law, and to accounts that describe constitutional law
as a special kind of law, which I call "political law." Despite the distinction,
it is important to emphasize that those who treat constitutional law as political
law do not deny that constitutional law is law after all. Rather, they contend
that the intimate relation between constitutional law and the permissibility of
legislative choices gives constitutional law a political component that is absent
from, or at least operates differently in, ordinary law. 26
The difference between ordinary law and law with a political component
(i.e., political law) is difficult to pin down. It is commonplace today for judges
developing tort law or contract law-ordinary law in the usual sense--to make
policy judgments that are indistinguishable in principle from those made by
legislators. It is almost equally as commonplace for politics, brought into the
academic literature via public-choice approaches to law-making, to be driven
by voters' or legislators' preferences. However, it is quite hard to make sense
of the idea that constitutional law, understood as political law, should be
preference-driven.
Accordingly, the distinction between ordinary law and political law must
be drawn on a more abstract level. We can begin with the following
observation: the process of making ordinary law concentrates on the
interpretation of texts that preexist the decision at hand, whereas the process
of legislating is much more loosely tied to preexisting texts. Therefore, the
"law" component of constitutional law draws our attention to the texts that the
judges interpret; however, many of those texts use fairly abstract terms, such
as "liberty" or "equality" or derivations of these terms. 27 Next, suppose that
24. This consideration is related to the first collateral point because lawyers in civil-law
systems seem to be more committed to legal positivism than lawyers in common-law systems.
25. A related but independent point is that the number of judges available to staff
constitutional courts might be quite small because of the nation's size (in addition to, or rather
than, because of the taint of experience under the prior regime). This complication can create
interesting problems.
26. I develop this distinction in more detail in Mark Tushnet, Institutions for
Implementing Judicial Review, in CRAFTING AND OPERATING INSTITUTIONS (Ian Shapiro ed.,
forthcoming).
27. For these purposes, terms such as "freedom of expression" and "establishment of
religion" are abstract when compared with the terms used in the Twenty-Seventh Amendment
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we refrain from accepting the strongest versions of public-choice accounts of
the legislative process and, instead, agree that voters and legislators try, to
some degree, to advance visions of good public policy rather than, or in
addition to, mere self-interest narrowly defined. Among those visions will be
the voters' and legislators' judgments about which policies advance liberty,
equality, and the like-the same abstract constitutional terms that judges are
also interpreting. Finally, by focusing on the role that principle plays in
electoral and legislative politics, we can understand how constitutional law can
be both legal (because of its attention to texts and inattention to preferences)
and political (because of the abstract terms used in the texts and the attention
voters and legislators give to principle).
In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall built his argument for judicial review
on the proposition that the Constitution is ordinary law, although supreme over
other forms of ordinary law. 28 Perhaps Marshall was driven to this proposition
because the Constitution's text did not specifically provide for judicial review.
Contemporary judges deal with texts that do authorize judicial review, and,
therefore, can rely on the text to justify judicial review rather than seeking to
ground it in the idea of law itself, as Marshall had to do.
The idea that constitutional law was a special kind of law took hold in the
twentieth century, particularly through the theorizing of the Austrian
jurisprude Hans Kelsen, who incorporated his theories of judicial review into
the design of the Austrian Constitutional Court, a model that inspired the more
directly influential design of the German Constitutional Court. 29 Kelsen
thought that a constitutional court had to be a special kind of court because
constitutional law was a special kind of law. 30 That constitutional law was
political law meant, to Kelsen, that a constitutional court had to (1) be
specialized, so that its judges would appreciate the fact that constitutional law
was not ordinary law; (2) be concentrated, so that judges on ordinary courts
would not pollute ordinary law with the political character of constitutional
law and so that judges on the constitutional court would not pollute
constitutional law with ideas inappropriately drawn from ordinary law; and
(3) engage in abstract review, so that the public would view judicial review as
continuous with the political process of enacting laws, rather than as
something superimposed on statutory law after its enactment.
How do the different theories of constitutional law as law-either ordinary
or political-matter? On the ground level, they may affect the way in which
judges are selected. If constitutional law is merely ordinary (though supreme)
law, the selection criteria for constitutional court judges will include a large

to the United States Constitution.
28. Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,178 (1803).
29. See Tom Ginsburg, &onomic Analysis and the Design of Constitutional Courts,
3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 49, 57 (2002).
30. See John E. Ferejohn, Constitutional Review in the Global Context, 6 N. Y. U. 1. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL'y 49,52-53 (2002).
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degree of attention to ordinary legal competence. Selection committees might
be expected to ask the following questions: Is the proposed judge qualified in
professional terms? Does she have a wide enough range of experience across
legal areas to assure us that she is a generally competent lawyer?31 In contrast,
if constitutional law is political law, attention to legal competence will be
supplemented by concern about whether the proposed judge can adequately
assess the political dimensions of constitutional law.
The German system for appointing judges to the Constitutional Court is
instructive here. The system requires the approval of two-thirds of the relevant
bodies, which effectively gives a well-organized minority a veto.32 At least in
a political system with two (or only a small number of) political parties, the
existence of a minority veto conduces to reasonably explicit dealmaking on
appointments, with the governing party getting one or two appointments for
each one the minority party gets. 33 Similar deals are possible, though more
difficult to reach, in multi-party systems. Creating the two-thirds requirement
acknowledges the political dimension of constitutional law by making it more
likely that appointments will result from open political deals. 34 The fact that
political deals occur in the open reflects the greater "comfort level" with
giving political considerations an explicit role when the theory of judicial
review is that constitutional law is different from ordinary law.
The contrast between Germany and the United States is again instructive.
In the United States, the rhetoric of nominations and confirmations is one in
which the claim that the nominee will simply follow the law has a great deal

31. There may be some interaction between a theory of judicial review that treats
constitutional law as ordinary law and a dispersed structure of judicial review. The more
constitutional law is treated as ordinary law, the more lawyers there will be who are qualified
to adjudicate issues of constitutional law. Because a dispersed structure requires more judges
who are qualified to adjudicate issues of constitutional law than does a concentrated structure,
it may be easier to operate a dispersed system if one's theory of judicial review treats
constitutional law as ordinary law.
32. Ferejohn, supra note 30, at 57.
33. Obviously, the ratio will depend on the size of the governing party's majority,
although the fact that the veto exists will push toward a one-ta-one ratio.
34. I would make something, but not much, of the facts that the U.S. system treats
constitutional law as ordinary law, has a simple majority requirement for appointment, and has
proven to be quite resistant to dealmaking over judicial appointments. The exception may
actually indicate the connection that I am drawing here. For many years, if the President
belonged to one party and both senators from a state belonged to the other party, those senators
had, as a matter of informal Senate practice, the power to veto court of appeals appointments
allotted by tradition to their state. This led to some degree of accommodation between the
President and the senators. The practice has weakened in recent years, largely because of the
way divided government has developed, with increasing numbers of states having senators from
a single party. This increased the number of times when a veto could be exercised to a level
that presidents found difficult to tolerate. For statistics, see MARK TuSHNET, THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 181 n.59 (2003).
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of purchase. It is extraordinary to find a nominee who would acknowledge
that politics, in some sense, is an essential element in developing good
constitutional law. Kelsenians and many mainstream U.S. legal academics
would say that the rhetoric of merely following the law fails to capture the
reality of constitutional adjudication.
IV. FORMS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

So far, it should be clear that the U.S. model of judicial review is not one
that is widely followed throughout the world. The combination of life-tenured
judges on a generalist court with the system of dispersed judicial review, in
which constitutional law is theorized as ordinary but supreme law, is, if
perhaps not unique,3S surely quite unusua1. 36
Until recently, however, another feature of the U.S. system does seem to
have been emulated widely. This feature is what I have called the strength of
judicial review. 37 Strong-form systems of judicial review have two elements:
First, judicial review is comprehensive so that judges with the power to
determine constitutionality have the power to determine the constitutionality
of every (or nearly every) action by the legislature and the executive. Second,
judicial review is binding on all branches, in the sense that nonjudicial actors
feel a duty to conform their action to the constitutional interpretations offered
by the courts even when the nonjudicial actors are not immediately subject to
coercive sanctions from the courts.
Once again, Marbury is the likely origin of strong-form review, as
evidenced by the Court's statement that "[i]t is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. ,,38 Although Marbury
did mention a category of cases in which the judgments of the political
branches would be final 39-a mention that developed into the political
question doctrine--the existence of a category of constitutional questions
outside the scope of judicial review will seem quite anomalous in a generally

35. I am not in a position to say that it is unique because I do not know enough about the
variety of systems of judicial review in the world. One good maxim of comparative
constitutional law is that any arrangement you can imagine occurs at least once somewhere in
the world. However, the maxim provides no insight into the question of whether, or under what
conditions, arrangements occur more than once.
36. This is particularly so when one adds to this description the fact that the U.S.
Constitution is among the most difficult to amend.
37. For discussions of both strong- and weak-form systems of judicial review, see Mark
Tushnet, New Forms ofJudicial Review and the Persistence ofRights- and Democracy-Based
Worries, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 813 (2003) [hereinafter Tushnet, New Forms]; Mark
Tushnet, Alternative Forms ofJudicial ReView, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2781 (2003).
38. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
39. See id. at 165-66.
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strong-fonn system, and indeed the political question doctrine has not really
flourished. 40
Of course, saying that it is the judicial department's duty to say what the
law is need not be taken to imply that no one else has such a dUty41 or that the
Court's statements of the law control all others' decisions. In other words,
Marbury did not have to become the origin of strong-fonn review. Indeed,
whether the United States had a strong-fonn system was contested for quite a
while, and, in my view, the history of the evolution of strong-fonn review
remains to be written. 42 By 1893, the proposition that judicial review in the
United States was strong-fonn review must have been an important
conceptualization of review, for in that year James Bradley Thayer wrote his
famous essay on judicial review,43 whose arguments critical ofjudicial review
make sense only on the assumption that he believed that judicial review was
strong-fonn review.
We know that the United States adopted the strong-fonn system ofjudicial
review no later than 1958 because the canonical statement of the assumptions
underlying strong-fonn review came in Cooper v. Aaron,44 the Little Rock
school desegregation case decided in that year. According to the Supreme
Court in that case, "[Marbury] declared the basic principle that the federal
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution ... .'04S
It "follow[ed]," the Court said, that the Court's interpretations are "the
supreme law ofthe land," and that "[e]very state legislator and executive and
judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath" to support the

40. For my analysis, see Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law ofJusticiability:
The Transformation and Disappearance ofthe Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REv.
1203 (2002). For a different view, see L. Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political
Question Doctrine, 1. MARsHALL L. REv. (forthcoming 2004).
41. Further, to the extent that the Marbury Court justified judicial review by relying on
the fact that judges take an oath to support the Constitution, see Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at
179-80, the fact that legislators and executive officials take a parallel oath justifies a
departmentalist approach to constitutional interpretation.
42. One can impose on Barry Friedman's series of articles about the evolution of the socalled countermajoritarian difficulty an interpretive structure addressing the question of how
the U.S. system became strong-form review, but doing so takes some work. See, e.g., Barry
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to
Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 333 (1998); Barry Friedman, The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 971 (2000);
Barry Friedman, The Birth ofan Academic Obsession: The History ofthe Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002).
43. lames B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope ofthe American Doctrine ofConstitutional
Law, 7 HARv. L. REv. 129 (1893).
44. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
45. Id at 18.
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Constitution-meaning the Supreme Court's interpretations of the
Constitution. 46
Cooper was not controversial when it was decided, except, of course,
among segregationists who were discredited because of their views on race.
Over the next several generations, the idea that judicial review must be strongform review became something akin to conventional wisdom. So, when
Attorney General Edwin Meese reasserted a departmentalist view of
constitutional interpretation in 1987,47 a storm of protest erupted. The depth
to which strong-form review has become embedded in constitutional law is
illustrated as well by the lack of controversy over City of Boerne v. Flores,48
in which the Court said that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
give Congress the power to enact substantive laws resting on interpretations
of the Constitution's rights-protecting provisions that differed from the Court's
interpretations. 49 Similarly, in Dickerson v. United States,SO which was even
less controversial, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected Congress's attempt to
substitute its own judgment for that of the Court regarding what safeguards are
necessary to secure a suspect's right against self-incrimination during custodial
police interrogations. sl
The actual decision in Marbury need not be taken as an example of strongform review. The Court considered whether it was obliged to apply a statute
that the Justices, exercising their own judgment about the Constitution's
meaning, concluded improperly conferred authority on them to decide a
substantive question. 52 Instead, Marbury could have been treated as what
some have called a departmentalist decision in two possible senses. First,
departmentalism might mean that each department has the final word on the
constitutionality oflegislation, executive actions, or judicial decrees affecting
its own operation. So, for example, the courts have the last word on the
constitutionality of statutes setting out their jurisdiction, while the President
has the last word on the constitutionality of a judicial order directing the
President to deliver a commission to someone whose nomination to ajudicial
position has been confirmed by the Senate. Marbury easily can be seen as
departmentalist in this sense.
46. [d.
47. Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TuL. L. REv. 979,985 (1987)
("[C]onstitutional interpretation is not the business of the Court only, but also properly the
business of all branches of government.").
48. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
49. [d. at 519,535·36.
50. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
51. [d. at 432. Congress's judgment was that the suspect's rights could be protected by
a rule directing judges to exclude evidence produced by coercive interrogations; however,
unlike the rule previously announced by the Court, the fact that the suspect had not been warned
about his rights would be relevant to, but not dispositive of, the question of coercion. [d. at
435·36.
52. Marbury v. Madison,S U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176, 178 (1803).
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Second, departmentalism might mean that each branch of government has
the authority to exercise its independent judgment about every constitutional
question. So, for example, the fact that Congress believed it had the power
under the Constitution to give the Supreme Court original mandamus
jurisdiction is an interesting datum for the Supreme Court to consider, but the
Court need not take it as dispositive of its own evaluation of the constitutional
question. And, similarly, the fact that the Supreme Court believed the
Constitution did not authorize Congress to expand the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction is an interesting datum for Congress to consider when it
takes up proposals that would do precisely that, but Congress need not take the
Court's judgment to be dispositive on the issue.
The first version of departmentalism is straightforward and not difficult
to implement. The second is more complicated, however, because it seems to
set up a system in which the branches can be in repeated conflict over what the
Constitution means. The possibility of continuing conflict is reduced once we
realize that, on some questions, the practical possibility of conflict is quite
small. Although Congress can pass as many laws expanding the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction as it wants, the Supreme Court can simply continue to
refuse to exercise the jurisdiction thrust upon it. s3 No crisis would arise as
long as the people understood that we had a departrnentalist constitutional
system.
Furthermore, conflict, when and if it arose, might produce a deeper
constitutionalism rather than crisis. It would demonstrate that constitutional
law is indeed political law, and that conflicts over the proper interpretation of
the Constitution have to be worked out through a political system that,
although taking into account the Constitution's text, is not determined by the
text or, worse, by authoritative interpretations of the text.
Early designers of modern systems ofjudiciaI review, including those who
drafted the German Basic Law, seem to have assumed that judicial review
needed to have a strong form. S4 In recent decades, though, alternatives to

53. The scope ofthis point is broader than it might initially appear. It covers all cases in
which Congress seeks to use the courts to implement laws the courts believe to be
unconstitutional. If, for example, the courts believe that laws making it a criminal offense to
bum a flag as a means of political protest are unconstitutional, there is not much Congress and
the President can do about flag burning. They could throw the flag burners in jail without
invoking legal processes, which, in tum, would lead to the invocation of the writ of habeas
corpus as a way to chal\enge executive detentions unauthorized by law. Legislative and
executive resistance to the writ would then raise questions about the scope ofthe clause barring
the suspension of the privilege ofthe writ. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, c1. 2. My own judgment
is that, were the United States to reach this point, we would be in such serious constitutional
trouble that deciding whether the Constitution was departmentalist in this second sense would
be the least of our worries.
54. I should point out here that judges in a strong-form system can choose to defer to
legislative judgments, as Thayer urged. See Thayer, supra note 43, at 135. Ordinarily,
deference means deference to judgments about the wisdom of mere policy choices, but it could
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strong-form judicial review have emerged. So, it might seem, the U.S. system
of strong-form judicial review might become an outlier among systems of
judicial review. In contrast to my view that the U.S. system is indeed an
outlier with respect to structure and theory, I believe that the U.S. system will
not become an outlier with respect to form because weak-form systems are
likely to be transformed into strong-form systems of review. Weak-form
systems are quite new, and the evidence about how they actually operate is
quite thin. Therefore, much of what I say rests both on extrapolations from
that evidence and on judgments about the dynamics of weak-form systems.
I explore three versions of weak-form review: (1) the Canadian
notwithstanding clause, (2) interpretive mandates, and (3) democratic
experimentalism. 55 Defenders of these forms of judicial review argue that
these forms have the advantage over strong-form review of reconciling
constitutionalism-which requires that the desires of democratic majorities at
anyone time yield to the requirements specified by constitution-makers at
some earlier time-with democratic self-govemance-which would seem to
require that a democratic majority's desires be honored-in a way that
preserves a larger and more appropriate role for self-governance than strongform systems do. 56
The Canadian notwithstanding clause, section 33 of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, provides the simplest illustration of weak-form
review. This clause provides that a legislature may make a statute effective for
a period of no more than five years notwithstanding the statute's
incompatibility with many of the Charter's fundamental rights provisions. 57
Functioning at its best, the notwithstanding mechanism would operate in the
following way: The legislature enacts a statute, which is later challenged in
the courts. If the courts hold that the statute is inconsistent with some Charter
provision, the legislature then has the opportunity to reconsider the statute. At

mean deference to legislative judgments about what a constitution means. The important point
is that deference and the choice of issues on which the courts will defer are choices made by
the judges, unconstrained by anything in the structure or theory of judicial review.
55. See sources cited supra note 37.
56. See. e.g., KENT ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR
DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE (2001) (defending Canada's system in these terms). The usual
objection to democratic self-government is that we cannot know that a government is
democratic without some antecedent agreement on some substantive requirements for
democracy, such as a broad franchise, the ability to disseminate one's political views without
substantial governmental interference, and the like. The difficulty with this objection is that
proponents of franchise restrictions, limitations on expression, and the like always
contend-with reason-that the restrictions they propose are compatible with democracy
properly understood. The real difficulty with democratic constitutionalism is determining how
to resolve reasonable disagreements over these features of a system of governance. The most
astute analysis of which I am aware is FRANKMICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY (1999).
57. See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 33(1), (3).
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this point, the legislature can either (1) modify the statute to meet the courts'
objections, in which case the courts again can review the legislation to see if
the legislature has actually responded appropriately, or (2) re-enact the statute
and protect it with a "notwithstanding" declaration. s8 The process, operating
at its best, brings issues of fundamental rights to the attention of a legislature
that might have overlooked them, offers a judicial assessment of the
competing values implicated by the statute, and gives the legislature a chance
to consider whether it agrees with the courts' assessment. Constitutionalism
is respected because of the focused attention paid to fundamental rights (and
because the courts' assessment might prevail), and self-governance is
respected because the majority's considered judgment can become legally
effective.
Interpretive mandates direct the courts to interpret legislation-sometimes
all statutes, including those on the books at the time the interpretive mandate
is enacted, and sometimes only post-enactment mandates-so as to ensure that
the statutes, as interpreted, are consistent with the constitution. Typically,
interpretive mandates do not require that courts ignore the evident meaning of
a statute's terms, but they do require that courts subordinate their otherwise
applicable modes of statutory interpretation to the interpretive mandate. S9
The first Canadian Bill of Rights Act was an interpretive mandate,60 as is
the New Zealand Bill of Rights ACt. 61 Although it is generally thought that the
Canadian Bill of Rights Act has had little effect, some scholars believe that the
New Zealand Act has been quite effective. The British Human Rights Act
1998, which took effect in 2000, contains an interpretive mandate that is
supplemented by a power in the courts to declare legislation incompatible with

58. My description omits many important details. For example, section 1 ofthe Charter
states that the rights created elsewhere in the Charter may be limited when "demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society." [d. § 1. After a statute has been found incompatible
with the Charter, a legislature might engage in a detailed fact-finding process and develop a
record supporting a "demonstration" that the legislation is indeed justified in a free and
democratic society. It could then re-enact the original statute unmodified, in hopes that the new
record would persuade the courts that the rights violation was in fact justified, and, therefore,
that the Charter was not violated. In addition, the Canadian Supreme Court has held that the
notwithstanding clause can be invoked prospectively, before a court finds that the statute is
inconsistent with the Charter. See Ford v. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, 742-45. Prospective
uses of the clause preempt dialogue. I originally thought that the Ford decision was
unfortunate, but, upon reflection, I believe that the possibility of prospective invocation of
section 33 is a valuable design feature of the system. For a brief discussion of this point, see
Tushnet, New Forms, supra note 37, at 819 n.24.
59. For a discussion in the British context, see Geoffrey Marshall, The United Kingdom
Human Rights Act, 1988, in DEFINING rnE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 107,
112-14 (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2002).
60. Canadian Bill of Rights, ch. 44, § 2, 1960 S.C. 519 (Can.), reprinted in R.S.C., app.
III (1985).
61. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990, § 6 (N.Z.).
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the European Convention on Human Rights if that legislation cannot be
interpreted so as to make it compatible. 62 In the event that a declaration of
incompatibility is made, the minister responsible for the legislation has the
power to introduce amendatory legislation in the ordinary course, to place such
legislation on a fast track for parliamentary approval, or even, in some
circumstances, to amend the legislation directly subject to subsequent
parliamentary approval or disapproval.
Democratic experimentalist judicial review is a new form described by
Charles Sabel and his colleagues at Columbia Law School. 63 They use recent
school finance decisions in the United States to illustrate this form of judicial
review. 64 I have suggested that the South African Constitutional Court might
be moving in the direction of utilizing democratic experimentalist review in
cases involving social welfare rights. 6s
Democratic experimentalist review begins with a challenge to some
practice as inconsistent with a constitutional provision that is stated at a rather
abstract level. 66 The case for democratic experimentalism is strongest when
the challenged practice is fairly widespread. The democratic experimentalist
court acknowledges that the provision is open to a range of interpretations, but
concludes that the questioned practice lies outside any reasonable
interpretation. Rather than coming up with its own interpretation, though, the
democratic experimentalist court directs everyone implicated in the challenged
practice to come up with their own interpretations and, importantly, with
alternative methods of implementing the provision pursuant to those varying
interpretations. 67 The democratic experimentalist court also points out that
each decision-maker ought to examine what the others do, both in interpreting
the constitution and implementing their interpretations. These examinations

62.

Human Rights Act, 1998, c.42, §§ 3-4 (Eng.).
63. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267 (1998).
64. See, e.g., James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely
Imagined: The Emerging Model ofSchool Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.V. REv. L.
& Soc. CHANGE 183 (2003); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and
Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REv. 831 (2000).
65. Mark Tushnet, State Action. Social Welfare Rights. and the Judicial Role: Some
Comparative Observations, 3 V. CHI. J. INT'L L. 435, 448-49 (2002).
66. For a recent description of experimentalist practices and their stages, see Charles F.
Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117
HARv. L. REv. 1015 (2004).
67. Sabel and his colleagues have focused on cases in which the courts, after holding that
a constitutional provision, properly interpreted, identifies some goals that legislation must
achieve, have allowed the relevant decision-makers to devise alternative methods for achieving
those goals. In principle, though, democratic experimentalism can be applied to constitutional
interpretation itself and, in my view, is most interesting when it is. See. e.g., Michael C. Dorf,
Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N. Y. U. L. REv. 875,972-73 (2003 )(referring
to the "hard cases" in which democratic experimentalism is used in this manner).
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allow decision-makers to learn from each other. At the next stage, the
democratic experimentalist court examines the varying interpretations and
implementations that have been developed and identifies those that have
worked least well. The court directs the decision-makers who chose bad
interpretations to abandon them and to choose some other interpretation from
the ones developed by other decision-makers. In addition, the democratic
experimentalist court may modify its prior understanding of what the
constitution means upon discovering that decision-makers who appear to be
doing the best job have acted on constitutional understandings that differ from
the one first articulated by the court. If everything goes well, practices will
improve continuously as decision-makers learn from each other which
interpretations are better, in their own view, and as the democratic
experimentalist court learns from the decision-makers which interpretations
are better, in its view.
Each version of weak-form judicial review seems to hold out the promise
of augmenting democratic self-governance with a form of judicial review that
promotes reasoned consideration of fundamental rights without imposing on
democratic majorities the judges' view of what the constitution means. I have
become skeptical about the claims made on behalf of weak-form systems of
review, largely because such systems seem to me to degenerate into strongform systems. I am skeptical because a combination of experience and
analysis of incentives suggests that the relevant decision-makers-both
legislators and jUdges-may drift toward transforming weak-form review into
strong-form review. 68
We now have two decades of experience with Canada's notwithstanding
clause. It has been invoked in only a few instances, and the most important
ones have been in political settings that brought the notwithstanding
mechanism into some disrepute. 69 In probably the most prominent non-use of
the notwithstanding clause, the Canadian government accepted a Supreme
Court ruling sharply limiting the government's power to regulate tobacco
advertising. 70 Apparently, the government briefly considered using the

68. The arguments in the succeeding paragraphs are developed in a somewhat different
form in Tushnet, New Forms, supra note 37.
69. After one minor use of the clause to forestall an anticipated holding that the Charter
protected the rights ofpubJic employees to strike (a mistaken anticipation), Quebec made the
first major use of the notwithstanding clause in order to insulate al\ of its statutes from Charter
chal\enge. In Ford v. Quebec, the Canadian Supreme Court upheld that use of the clause, but
the Court nevertheless managed to find a basis for invalidating the most controversial aspects
of Quebec's law regulating the use ofEngJish on commercial signs. See [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712,
779-80. More recently, the government of Alberta used the notwithstanding clause to define
marriage as an institution involving only heterosexuals, correctly anticipating judicial rulings
finding that a bar on gay marriage violates the Charter's equality provisions. See Marriage Act,
R.S.A., ch. M-5, § 2 (2000) (Can.).
70. RlR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199.
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notwithstanding clause but, in the end, decided to modify its legislation to
conform to the Court's requirements.'·
In addition, Janet Hiebert's study of how government bureaucrats have
responded to the Canadian Supreme Court suggests some degree of
anticipatory over-deference. 72 Implicit in this finding is a recognition that the
drafters of legislation in Canada are generally long-term civil servants. Their
bureaucratic routines require that they submit proposed legislation to a unit
charged with determining whether the draft is consistent with the Charter.'3
That unit and the other civil servants could, of course, evaluate potential
Charter challenges by invoking their own understandings of the Charter.
Instead, and reasonably, they seek to insulate the legislation from later
invalidation by what Canadians have come to call "Charter proofing" the
statute.'4 Charter proofing, then, is an expression of the civil servants' risk
aversion. The problem Hiebert identifies is that the civil servants may
overcorrect-that is, they may submit legislative proposals that fall well within
the constraints that the Supreme Court would enforce, rather than proposals
that press precisely up to the limits that the drafters think the Court would
enforce. 75 If so, Charter proofing successfully forestalls later challenges, but
at the cost, in the first instance, of whatever policy gains might attend more
aggressive statutory language and, in the second instance, of giving the
Supreme Court no chance to reflect on the legislature'S views about what the
Charter should be taken to mean.
Of course, the mere fact that Canadian governments have not invoked the
notwithstanding clause might show only that governments generally have
agreed with the Supreme Court. And even if they disagreed, the point of the
notwithstanding clause was to make it politically costly for a government to
enact its view of what the Charter allows when that view differs from the one
held by the Supreme Court. The non-use of the clause, then, might reflect the
governments' judgment that the political costs of disagreeing with the
Supreme Court exceed the benefits of enacting statutes expressing that express
the governments' view of the Charter's meaning. Note, however, that the
political costs occur because the Canadian public must accept the Court's
interpretation of the Charter, whatever it is, over the governments'
interpretation. If the fear of political costs is part of the reason for the non-use
of the notwithstanding clause, it seems to weaken the case that the clause
fosters a valuable dialogue on what the Charter means. Furthermore, the
existence of political costs suggests that the Canadian public has come to treat

71.

ROACH, supra note 56, at 185.

72.

JANET L. HIEBERT, CHARTER CONFLICTS: WHAT Is PARLIAMENT'S ROLE? (2002).

73. See id. at 54.
74. Id. at 54-55.
75. Id. at 55.
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Canada's version of judicial review as a reasonably strong-fonn one despite
the notwithstanding clause. 76
The interpretive mandate gives courts the weakest role of all in a system
that can still be called one with judicial review. Stated most generally, an
interpretive mandate may be transfonned into strong-fonn review as courts
invoke it to interpret a statute "creatively" so as to avoid the conclusion that
the legislature wanted to violate some fundamental right. Although
legislatures might respond, their responses would be subject to further
interpretation. Consider the situation after a court says that the language used
by the legislature would, on ordinary interpretive principles, violate a
fundamental right were it not for the interpretive mandate, which allows the
language to be interpreted in a way that does not violate the right. Suppose the
legislature disagrees with the court's conclusion that the language, without the
interpretive mandate, would violate the fundamental right. What can it do?
The legislature's only real option is to re-enact the statute, saying, in effect,
that the legislature really meant what it said the first time. Perhaps the court
would respond by reconsidering its own interpretation of the underlying right
in light of the re-enacted statute, but it is more likely that the court would
restate its own interpretation-again using the interpretive mandate. 77 Given
this prospect, it is even more likely that the legislature would respond to the
court's initial decision by modifying the legislation to fit the court's
interpretation of fundamental rights.
Experience with democratic experimentalist review is much thinner, and,
accordingly, my skepticism is less well-grounded and weaker. The risks with
democratic experimentalist review are that it will degenerate into no review at
all or that it will escalate into strong-fonn review. The risks arise because the
higher courts might become frustrated with what they see as resistance by
lower-level decision-makers to the higher courts' push toward
experimentation, comparison, and adoption of best practices. Although
directed to experiment with and compare various nonviolative practices, the
lower-level decision-makers might make only the smallest possible
modifications of what they had done before. This course is particularly
attractive to the extent that the higher courts' directives do not change the
76. See Michael J. Perry, Protecting Human Rights in a Democracy: What Role/or the
Courts?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 635, 670 (2003).
77. The express interpretive mandate in the British Human Rights Act raises a specific
problem. See supra note 62 and accompanying test. Suppose the courts use the mandate to do
something Parliament rejects, and Parliament enacts a statute making it clear that, in fact, it
wanted to do what the courts said it did not want to do. The courts would then declare the
legislation incompatible with the European Declaration of Human Rights. Undoubtedly, the
losing litigant would have an extremely strong claim before the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR), in large measure because the British courts' declaration would have made it
quite difficult for the British govemment to get the ECHR to apply its "margin of appreciation"
doctrine to the statute. For a discussion of this doctrine, see Mark Tushnet, Non-Judicial
Review, 40 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 453, 482-84 (2003).
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political incentives the lower-level decision-makers face, for example, from
the constituents who elect them. 78
Frustration could lead the experimentalist court to declare victory and go
home. That is, the court could abandon its own understanding of what the
constitution means and adopt the understanding proffered by recalcitrant
lower-level decision-makers, rather than moving slightly away from its prior
understanding in light of the knowledge gained by the experience. 79
Alternatively, the frustrated experimentalist court could escalate the demands
it makes of the lower-level decision-makers. Instead of giving them broad
discretion to experiment, the court could take their resistance as a reason for
confining their discretion narrowly.
South Africa's experience in enforcing social welfare rights illustrates the
problem, although I emphasize that the decisions I discuss do not truly
exemplify-except in an extended sense-the iterative process of democratic
experimentalist adjudication. The story begins with the widely noted case of
Republic ofSouth Africa v. Grootboom. 80 There, South Africa's Constitutional
Court confronted claims by homeless people that the government's policy
failed to comply with the constitution's requirement that people were to be
guaranteed decent shelter. 81 The plaintiffs' plight was extraordinarily
desperate, and it had been exacerbated by government policies. 82 The
Constitutional Court held that the government was under a duty to the

78. Liebman and Sabel, supra note 64, are alert to this problem and describe
experimentalist processes working their way up from the bottom in ways that do alter the lowerlevel decision-makers' immediate political incentives.
79. Two examples come to mind. The first example involves New Jersey's tortured
experience with a judicial attempt to induce suburbs to accept some low-income housing.
Although the judiciary had a small degree of success, resistance was large, and-as I interpret
the story-the New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately concluded that it had done all it could do
and declared that the constitutional requirements it had articulated were in fact satisfied. See
Tushnet, New Forms, supra note 37, at 828. In the second example, the Canadian Parliament
responded to a Supreme Court decision regulating the admissibility of evidence in sexual
assault cases with a statute essentially enacting the position taken by the Court's dissenters.
ROACH, supra note 56, at 277-78. The Supreme Court then deferred to Parliament and held that
the statute was consistent with the Charter's requirements. [d. at 279. Some commentators
believe that the Court acquiesced in the face of insurmountable political opposition. See, e.g.,
id. at 279-81. But see HIEBERT, supra note 72, at 110-16 (noting that the composition of the
Court had changed in the intervening time and that the Court acknowledged the "need for interinstitutional respect"). The Court itself said that it had learned from Parliament's response,
which might allow us to treat the decision upholding the statute as an example of the second
round in a democratic experimentalist process.
80. 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC), available at 2000 SACLR LEXIS 126. For further
discussions regarding the significance of the Grootboom decision, see CASS R. SUN STEIN,
DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do 224-37 (2001); Tushnet, supra note 65,
at 448-50.
81. Grootboom, (11) BCLR at para. 13.
82. See id. at paras. 6-11.
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plaintiffs, but that the duty did not extend to the point of assuring that the
plaintiffs be provided decent housing. 8) Rather, the Court held that the
government had to develop a plan for providing housing to the poor that
specifically took into account the conditions of the desperately needy.84
Although the plan might not actually address the specific problems of the
plaintiffs before the Court, the constitutional requirement nevertheless would
be satisfied so long as the government incorporated the class's needs into its
overall housing program. The experimentalist aspect of this decision lies in
the possibility of subsequent review of the plan developed by the government.
In that review, the Constitutional Court could assess whether the government's
plans reflect a reasonable judgment about ways of satisfying the constitution's
social welfare requirements.
The South African Constitutional Court's next confrontation with
constitutional social welfare rights led to a substantially more directive-and
less experimentalist-oriented outcome. As the Court explained in Minister
of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign,8S South Africa is experiencing an
HIVI AIDS epidemic. 86 Nevirapine is a drug that is quite effective in stopping
transmission of mv from mothers to their newborn children, particularly
when coupled with counseling from nurses about breastfeeding and its
alternatives. 87 Nevirapine's manufacturer agreed to supply a quantity of the
drug sufficient for all pregnant women with HIV/AIDS in South Africa at
essentially no COSt. 88 The government set up several sites for the distribution
of Nevi rapine but did not make it available to all mothers with HIV/AIDS. 89
The government took the position that, while the drug could be made available
everywhere, the accompanying counseling could not. 90 The government
argued that the drug's long-term effects were unknown and that its program
of restricted distribution allowed it to conduct well-designed research on those
effects and other related questions. 91
The Constitutional Court held that the government had to make the drug
available at every public hospita1. 92 The Court rejected the government's
argument that the limited, yet essential, availability of counseling services
justified its restrictive drug administration policy by noting that the
government could train nurses to give the necessary counseling at relatively
83. See id. at paras. 93-94 (noting that although the "Constitution obliges the state ....
to provide access to housing," it does not require the state "to go beyond available resources or
to realise these rights immediately").
84. [d. at para. 95.
85. 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC), available at 2002 SACLR LEXIS 26.
86. [d. at para. 1.
87. See id. at paras. 2 n.3, 57-58.
88. /d. at para. 19.
89. [d. at paras. 10-11.
90. [d. at paras. 48-49.
91. [d. at paras. 51-55.
92. /d. at para. 135.
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little COSt. 93 From my reading ofthe opinion, the Court's only response to the
argument regarding the need for research was that the constitutional guarantee
of access to medical care was more important. In the decision's background,
though, was the fact of recalcitrance: South African President Thabo Mbeki
was a notorious skeptic about the claim that the specific virus which
Nevirapine targeted was in fact the cause of AIDS. That is, the Constitutional
Court may have viewed the government's litigating position as a bad-faith
one-a subterfuge for simple disagreement with the science on which the
plaintiffs relied. In my terms, then, the Court may have viewed the
government as recalcitrant. And, in the face of such recalcitrance, the Court
abjured the course it had taken in Grootboom of asking only for a plan that it
could then review and, instead, directly imposed a significant regulatory
requirement.
As I have indicated, experience with democratic experimentalist forms of
review is thin, and I have extrapolated from cases that do not really involve
experimentalist review to suggest why it might not be stable. In contrast, the
reasons underlying the examples I have given-particularly the dynamics of
judicial responses to frustrated expectations-seem, to me, more widely
applicable. Still, it probably is worth continuing to experiment with
experimentalist forms of review.
My discussion of the Canadian experience and the likely outcomes under
interpretive mandates raises an important final question: Why should a person
committed to democratic self-governance through constitutionalism be at all
concerned if the people themselves accept-or at least acquiesce in-strongform judicial review? Perhaps one might be concerned if it seemed that the
people were acquiescing in a form of review that they did not fully understand.
So, for example, one might be troubled if the people believed that the
Canadian notwithstanding clause actually did promote dialogue between the
courts and Parliament when, in fact, the courts' position routinely prevailed.
The possibility that a fully-informed people acquiesces in strong-form
review is more interesting, I think.94 To illustrate, consider a survey in which
one could compare the judgments of the people as represented in the enacting
legislature-the people at time-one-with the judgments of the people after
the courts have spoken-the people at time-two. A democrat should not be
bothered if those judgments differ, wholly or in part, because of the courts'
decision. In this version of events, the courts' decisions inform the people's
judgment about what the constitution means.
Suppose instead that the people at time-two agree with the people at timeone and disagree with the courts. At this point, it is worth turning back from
forms of judicial review to the various structures of judicial review. All

93. Id. at para. 83.
94. For a theoretical discussion of whether strong-form review is compatible with the
notion of constitutional democracy, see Mark Tushnet, Forms 0/Judicial Review as Expressions
o/Constitutional Patriotism, 22 L. & PHIL. 353 (2003).
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structures allow for some degree of political control of the courts. Some
structural arrangements make it easier than others for.the people at time-two
to prevail, even if the official form of review is strong-form. Consider a
structure that allows political control to be exercised quite rapidly-for
example, through a system that allows constitutional amendments rather
easily. The difference between strong-form and weak-form review nearly
disappears in such a system. The courts can authoritatively declare that their
decisions are final, but the ready amendment procedure means that the people
at time-two can immediately implement a constitutional interpretation they
prefer to the courts' interpretation.
The acquiescence of a democratic people in strong-form review raises a
final paradox: Perhaps systems of judicial review can be strong-form only if,
in theory, they are weak-form. The idea is that we have to distinguish between
two kinds of judgments by the people at time-two. Those people might accept
what the courts proffer as the correct interpretation of the constitution.
Alternatively, they might not rebel against the courts' interpretation. But, the
only reliable way to determine whether the people have accepted the courts'
interpretation is to recognize that the people had a chance to reject it and
refrained from doing so. Only weak-form systems offer that opportunity.
Therefore, a democrat might find weak-form systems ofjudicial review easier
to swallow than strong-form ones even if, in practice, the courts' exercise of
the power ofjudicial review in a strong-form system was never rejected by the
people at time-two. In contrast, although the democrat confronted with a
strong-form system could be comfortable with decisions by the people at timetwo to accept the courts' interpretations, the democrat could never be assured
that the behavior she observed reflected such acceptance rather than resigned
acquiescence. 9s
V. CONCLUSION
The quick survey I have given of modem forms of judicial review looks
in two directions. From one perspective, the wide range of structures and
theories ofjudicial review indicates that Marbury, taken as a reference to U.S.style judicial review, actually has not been emulated widely. Nations adopting
systems of judicial review typically believe that judicial review has a larger
political content than Marbury's theory ofjudicial review would have it. And,
probably as a result, these nations have structured judicial review to ensure
more regular and overt political supervision of constitutional courts that are,

95. James Stoner makes the intriguing suggestion, in correspondence with me, that the
people of the United States have acquiesced in strong-form review because the Court has
adhered to reasonably strict "case or controversy" requirements in the areas of foreign policy
and military affairs, which-from the perspective of a certain kind of political theorist-are the
only subjects truly important to preserving a people's ability to govern itself.
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nonetheless, reasonably independent of the political branches in their day-today operations.
From the other perspective, however, if a reference to Marbury is taken
as a reference to strong-form judicial review, modem forms of review may
only seemingly differ from the U.S. system. The official accounts of
interpretive mandates, the possibility of a politically easy override of supreme
court decisions, and the like may distort the reality-at least in the long run.
I suspect that as experience with judicial review accumulates around the
world, we are likely to find that, in this sense, Marbury has indeed been
emulated widely.
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